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Firms repurchase stock for a variety of reasons, nearly all of which are consistent in spirit with enhancing shareholder value. Dittmar (2000) and Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004) along with many other papers document these various economic motivations and report evidence consistent with the idea that such transactions, on average, benefit the company. Among these various motives, undervaluation is often mentioned as a key factor. For example, in surveys of managers, mispricing is repeatedly identified as an important motivation and repurchases are considered to be a mechanism to enhance shareholder value when they perceive their stock as trading below fair value (Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) ).
1 Consistent with this view, several studies document positive long-term abnormal returns subsequent to a share repurchase announcement (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995 and 2000) and Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004) ). These findings are not only observed for repurchases in general, but are particularly strong in "value" cases where undervaluation would seemingly be most prevalent. Disagreement, though, exists as to the extent to which these announcements in whole or in part relate to inefficient pricing and also whether repurchases truly benefit shareholders in the long run. 2 Moreover, some papers conclude that some buybacks are not motivated by mispricing as they identify, ex-ante, subsets of buyback cases that do not seem to exhibit a post-announcement return drift, a result contrary to the general finding.
Yet if we return to the premise cited so frequently that undervaluation is a driving force behind at least some repurchases, a related question is whether insiders on occasion legitimately utilize this same mispricing information for their own personal trading. Previous papers (e.g., Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986) , Rozeff and Zaman (1988) , Seyhun (1988) , Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Griffin, Lont, and McClune 1 Brav et. al (2005) report that over 80% of corporations initiate stock repurchase programs when their stock is "a good value relative to other investments." See also Vermaelen (1981) , Dann (1981) , and Comment and Jarrell (1991) for earlier work on information signaling. 2 For example, Grullon and Michaely (2004) argue that repurchasing firms are, in fact, slowly maturing in a manner that is driving their cost of capital gradually downward, thus escalating share prices and falsely giving the appearance of an ex-post return drift. Fama (1998) raises a different argument, questioning the extent to which the information signals in repurchase announcements are material once trading costs are considered. Moreover, some papers argue that at least some managers appear to use repurchases in a misleading way by taking advantage of the flexibility of buyback programs to repurchase no stock whatsoever (e.g., Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2010) ).
(2010)) find evidence that insider trading is indeed informative and that managers indeed possess timing ability.
Given that the same decision makers serve at the core of both types of transactions, it seems logical then to ask if the post-announcement return drift to repurchases is related in any way to the presence (or absence) of sympathetic trades made by insiders. Is it the case that the timing considerations in one transaction are related in some manner to those in a seemingly similar transaction made by the same set of decision makers? Moreover, is there any evidence to suggest that combining the signal from a buyback announcement with concurrent insider trading information might be meaningful or useful to investors in real-time?
The key innovation of this paper is straightforward; to integrate real-time information about insider trading activity with information about firms announcing concurrent repurchase programs to see if the power of the repurchase signal is strengthened with this additional piece of potentially timing-related information. We do this by evaluating the return performance of an implementable trading strategy based only on publicly available information. Further, we consider analysis based on value-weighted investment strategies which are seemingly more appealing to the professional investment community given that in relative terms these portfolios have reasonably higher capacity for assets under management and do not rely on smaller, less liquid stocks. Additionally, with this emphasis the implied direct and indirect trading costs are also seemingly appealing.
We form a comprehensive sample of 9,976 U.S. open market repurchase cases announced from January 1990 to November 2010, and examine whether a simple trading strategy based on both share repurchase announcements and insider trading reports outperforms one exclusively focusing on buybacks.
Starting with the overall repurchase sample, we find, as shown in many other studies, significant longterm stock return drifts after share buyback announcements, suggesting that our sample behaves similarly to the repurchase samples used in prior studies, even though we have added more recent cases.
When we consider the marginal effect of adding insider trading information, the resulting return drift patterns differ for growth versus value buyback firms. For growth firms where one might argue that undervaluation is less likely to be motivating a repurchase, the addition of insider trading information is not particularly useful at the margin. 3 For value firms where the propensity for undervaluation as a group is seemingly higher, the addition of insider information leads to more impressive results. Here, insider trading behaviors do appear to add information at the margin. For value buyback companies where insiders concurrently show an abnormally elevated history of being net buyers, the size-and-book-tomarket benchmark-adjusted abnormal return is 44 basis points per month in the first post-announcement year, more than double what is observed otherwise. When estimated using a Fama-French three-factor model, the post-announcement drift for this group is 49 basis points per month (or almost 6% on an annualized basis).
Using conventional performance measures such as Sharpe, Treynor and Information Ratios, the marginal risk-adjusted return contributed by adding insider trading information is remarkable, but is again limited to value-buyback cases. Similarly, support for the undervaluation hypothesis is also strong for stocks with low analyst coverage where the potential for information asymmetry and mispricing is also seemingly high and where the information of sympathetic insider trades would intuitively be valuable to outside investors.
Some buyback transactions, of course, will not be driven by mispricing but rather by some other corporate financing behavior or factor. Our evidence, though, suggests that a clear sub-set of cases does appear to be motivated by mispricing and that investors can utilize insider trading information to identify cases that have a greater propensity to be driven by undervaluation. By linking two separate academic literatures on share repurchases and insider trading, we provide further insight into the debate questioning the economic motivation behind share repurchase announcements and managerial timing ability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data and the methods used in the paper. Section II presents information on insider trading around share repurchase announcements. Section III describes the empirical results and Section IV provides some concluding remarks.
I. Data and Methods

A. Data
We obtain our sample from open market repurchase announcements recorded at Securities Data Corporation over the period, January 1990 to November 2010. To reduce both the potential problem of bid-ask bounce when evaluating monthly returns as well as the problem of skewness when evaluating long-horizon returns (Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Loughran and Ritter (1996) ), we eliminate cases where the share price at the time of repurchase announcement is below $3. This leaves us with 9,976 cases over the full sample period.
For insider trading information, the complete record is obtained from the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Ownership Reporting System data files provided by Thomson Reuters. We define "insiders" as directors and officers and include trades made both on the open market and through private transactions. We also consider whether insider sales are associated with the exercise of stock options as previous research suggests that insiders often sell shares immediately around these events (e.g., Ofek and Yermack (2000) ). To focus on economically significant transactions, we exclude insider transactions involving less than 100 shares. A critical design element in this study relates to the timing of insider trades and the exact date this information becomes public. We take care to form portfolios after the actual reporting date (rather than transaction date) to ensure that the analysis reported here reflects an implementable strategy.
B. Methods
We measure long-term stock performance using two different methods. First, we employ an event-time approach and report abnormal stock returns assuming a holding period of four years following a buyback announcement. 4 Here, abnormal stock returns are measured relative to a group of control firms formed on the basis of market-cap and book-to-market equity ratio (B/M). Five non-repurchasing firms which have similar market-cap and B/M and which are also listed on the same stock exchange are matched as control firms for each repurchasing firm. Abnormal returns for a given buyback firm are then calculated relative to its respective custom benchmark. 5 These results imply equal-weighting. To identify abnormal insider trading activity, we use the same set of control firms formed on the basis of market-cap and B/M as those used to measure abnormal returns. This is important as previous studies show that the tendency for insiders to trade is related to firm characteristics such as size and B/M.
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As a second basic method, we form value-weighted, calendar-time portfolios and evaluate their performance using both a traditional academic approach and several performance measures widely considered in the money management community. These portfolios assume a shorter, 12-month investment horizon so that we focus more narrowly on return performance relating to the information signals we are considering (repurchases and insider trades). This reduces confounding effects caused by other information events that inevitably arise with a longer holding period. To implement this, each month during our sample period we form a value-weighted portfolio composed of firms which announced a buyback during the year prior to that month. 7 Value-weighting in this context is appealing in that it reduces the level of implied turnover simply due to monthly price volatility. Of course, each monthly portfolio is also less prone to rely on smaller, less liquid firms. The resulting monthly return series is further convenient for it allows us to use measures of return performance common to the investment community including the Sharpe, Treynor, and Information Ratios.
To consider the marginal impact of insider information, we classify our repurchasing sample into two groups on the basis of insider trading activity known at the time of the announcement. We do this by considering the net number of insider buy transactions relative to the number of sell trades during the sixmonth period prior to a given buyback announcement. Those classified as "Net Buy" are firms where insiders might be trading sympathetically with the firm's decision to repurchase stock compared to "Non Net." 8 As a further refinement, we identify cases where at the time of the repurchase announcement the number of insider purchases is at least three more than the number of insider sales during the prior sixmonth period. We label these cases as "Intensive Buy" and classify the balance of the sample as "Non
Intensive." Our decision to limit the definition of insider trading to transactions during the preceding six months is important for two reasons. First, we want to limit our cases to those where insider trading decisions were reasonably concurrent with the firm's repurchase decision. A second reason relates to the SEC "short-swing rule" essentially banning insiders from making short-term profits. 9 While this sixmonth window reduces the potential number of observable insider signals, the resulting measure of the insider buys which are observed is less confounded with reversing trades by informed insiders.
As a final refinement, we do not consider option-related sales in our definition of Net Buy or Intensive Buy transactions. Instead, we limit our focus to affirmative decisions to sell stock which are not, at least in part, related to the arbitrary timing of option expirations. ratio is 0.71. The median size decile is 3, indicating that our sample tilts in the direction of smaller firms.
II. Insider Trading around Share Repurchase Announcements
The median B/M quintile is 3, suggesting a generally even balance between growth and value firms.
Consistent with prior studies, buyback firms in our sample on average significantly underperform their respective size-and-B/M-matched control firms by a remarkable -15.48% during the 12 months prior to a buyback announcement. Upon the news of a repurchase announcement, the mean abnormal return is 1.83% measured over a 5-day period. While open market programs are by definition flexible, companies on average are announcing plans to repurchase 6.53% of their share base.
Table 1 also reports that there were 1.3 buy transactions among insiders in our sample worth $0.3 million in 2010 purchasing power in the preceding six months. This compares to 1.41 sell trades during the same window worth $3.4 million. Table 1 also clearly shows that the majority of insiders in our sample firms are not placing any trades at all in the six months preceding the repurchase announcement.
When we partition the full sample into different insider trading groups, the general finding of both poor trailing returns prior to a repurchase announcement and of positive buyback announcement returns also holds across these various sub-samples too.
In Table 2 , we take a more careful look at insider trading patterns surrounding repurchase announcements. 11 While we classify firms as "net buyers" or "intensive net buyers" using transactions occurring in a window of six months prior to a given buyback announcement, here, we look more broadly at insider trading patterns in the four years surrounding the announcement compared to their respective matching control firms.
In Panel A, insider purchases for the overall sample are significantly more common in buyback companies compared to non-buyback cases. For example, during the six-month interval prior to the announcement, insiders in repurchase firms buy 20% more frequently for themselves compared to their counterparts in non-announcing, matching firms. In fact, throughout the entire four-year period, the difference between these groups is significantly different from zero for each window we report.
Interestingly, insider selling is also significantly more common, both before and after a repurchase announcement, even after controlling for option-related transactions. 12 In sum, insiders in repurchasing firms apparently are, for whatever reason, more active traders, both buying and selling on personal account with greater frequency compared to non-announcing firms of similar size and similar valuegrowth characteristics. 13 One possibility for this elevated activity may relate to a self-selection bias in that our sample is drawn from firms whose officers may be more sensitive to mispricing and more willing to act on their respective firm's perceived valuation. It is also possible that the increased insider activity we observe may be due to increased insider ownership around buyback announcements as pointed out in Michel, Oded, and Shaked (2010) for accelerated share repurchases.
Looking at the overall sample, we do not see much evidence of insider trading patterns consistent with an information-or signaling-based motivation for share repurchases. On the other hand, it is well demonstrated that firms repurchase equity on the open market for a variety of reasons that reach well beyond simple mispricing and/or information signaling. For example, in firms with high B/M ratios (or value stocks where in many cases performance may have been poor for several years) undervaluation would indeed seem to be a predominant factor. For low B/M ratio firms that announce a buyback (or growth companies where returns preceding the announcement are typically high), other reasons such as returning excess cash, recalibrating capital structure or providing an alternative to a taxable dividend could be more predominant factors that do not necessarily signal mispricing.
14 12 We classify a sell trade as option-related for a given insider if it occurs within six months after the option was exercised and the number of shares sold was less than or equal to the number of shares covered by the option. 13 This contrasts with Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch (1992) who do not find increased insider selling in firms which use the tender offer mechanism to repurchase stock. The differences here may be due to several reasons, one being a difference in time period studied and another relating to the benchmark used to measure abnormal trading activity. Another key difference may relate to the increased risk executives face of being accused of self-dealing if insiders sell shares around tender offers given their highly publicized nature and the big price movements surrounding these events. The same may not be true for open market repurchases as the circumstances are quite different. 14 This is not to suggest undervaluation is never a factor motivating some growth-stock buybacks. Managers in some low B/M firms may have insight into mispricing that is not or cannot yet be recognized in the marketplace, and thus initiate a share repurchase. On the other hand, it is also the case that low B/M firms have typically experienced favorable stock returns in the recent past. To the extent that this past market success translates into hubris (Roll (1986) ), managers in these firms may mistakenly extrapolate this success into the future, implying a perceived
To explore these issues, we examine insider trading patterns separately in Panels B and C for growth and value firms. Insider buy transactions in the four years surrounding a repurchase announcement occur with greater frequency both for value and for growth firms compared to their corresponding matching firms. The reported point estimates of insider buy activity for value buyback companies tend to be significantly higher than those for growth.
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When we turn attention to insider sales, results for the two sub-samples diverge. For growth companies, we see very active insider selling activity surrounding a buyback announcement. Managers in firms classified as growth stocks are more active sellers. Even after controlling for these growth characteristics and the fact that managers in growth firms tend to be more active sellers, we still see substantially elevated levels of insider selling activity. This result is not consistent with the pattern one would anticipate if managers of growth firms viewed their stock as undervalued.
For value stock buyback companies, we do not see the same selling pattern. Insiders of value buyback firms sell their shares significantly less frequently than insiders of matching benchmark firms during the two years surrounding buyback announcements. This relative absence of insider selling by value companies is our first clue that insider trading behaviors may be consistent with an informationbased motivation for some share repurchases. Table 3 reports mean monthly abnormal returns of buyback sample firms overall and for different insider trading groups relative to their corresponding matching firms. 16 In Panel A, for the overall sample, we again see that repurchase companies suffer from remarkably poor performance in the 12 months prior to a repurchase announcement. Consistent with what has been reported in many previous studies, we also undervaluation that, ex-post, does not materialize. 15 Given this result and to conserve space, significance levels are omitted here. 16 While excluding low-priced stocks as we have done helps us to deal with the problem of bid-ask bounce, it does not fully eliminate the impact of skewness. To avoid the dominating effects of outliers, we report results in Tables 3,  4 and 5 after winsorizing returns at the top and bottom 1%. Returns lower (higher) than the 1 st (99 th ) percentile are replaced with the 1 st (99 th ) percentile return. This approach does not affect our conclusions yet it does allow the analysis to be more representative of overall sample performance. see that, following the announcement, abnormal performance reverses for these same firms, and that they begin to significantly outperform their size-and-B/M adjusted matching firms. In the first year, the point estimate is 26 basis points (bps) per month, followed by 36 bps in the second year and 26 bps in the third.
III. Long-Run Stock Performance
A. Event-time monthly abnormal returns conditional on insider trading
While other studies find a drift in the fourth post-announcement event year, the positive point estimate we report here is not significant using traditional confidence intervals. Although not reported in Table 3 , the mean abnormal return over the entire four-year post-announcement period is 24 bps per month (or approximately 11.5% over the entire four-year period) and is significant at traditional confidence intervals, a result consistent with the prior literature on open market buybacks.
When we separately examine the performance of growth buyback firms, we continue to see some evidence of positive post-announcement abnormal return drift, yet statistical significance of the drift is limited to the first and third years. For value firms, Panel A shows that the drift is much more robust.
These results are consistent with the notion that managements' motivation for this subset of buyback cases may indeed differ from that of growth firms.
Next, we integrate insider trading information into our repurchase analysis. When we examine the performance of different insider trading groups in Panels B to G in Table 3 , we find some differences in abnormal returns across insider trading groups for the overall sample and for value firms in particular.
Generally speaking, conditioning post-repurchase announcement performance on whether insiders were Net Buys or Intensive Buys provides additional information at the margin. In the next section, we examine the performance of monthly value-weighted buyback portfolios formed in calendar-time based on prior insider trading behavior, an alternative perspective that is perhaps more relevant to real-world investors.
B. Assessing the impact of insider trading behavior
Here, we estimate performance using a calendar-time technique many money managers might appreciate. Our implicit strategy is that a repurchase firm enters the portfolio in the month following its announcement and remains there for 12 months. 17 The same is done for sub-portfolios conditioned on how the firm's insider trading was classified at the time of the buyback announcement. As before, these portfolios are formed only from publicly available information known at the time of portfolio formation.
Here, we assume value-weighted portfolios so that our analysis is more consistent with how a real-world investor might pragmatically expect to implement this strategy. Table 4 presents return performance for various buyback portfolios using three common performance metrics: the Sharpe, Treynor, and Information Ratios. For comparison, we also report performance for naively formed style-based reference portfolios. 18 In practice, there is no consensus on which metric could or should dominate. Given this, we report all three metrics.
The average raw return for the overall buyback portfolio is 10.4%. By comparison, annualized mean returns for various reference portfolios during that same period range from 10.0% using the large benchmark to 17.2% for the small-value benchmark. 19 The Sharpe ratio of buyback firms overall is 0.47 whereas the Treynor ratio is 0.08. Although not reported here, these values are respectively higher than the same ratios of the large, growth and market reference benchmarks. Compared to small and value portfolios, buyback firms in general earned higher excess returns per unit of both total and systematic risk than non-value and non-small firms.
A key purpose of this paper is to consider the marginal impact of adding insider trading information to that of buybacks in general. Adding Net Buy information to the overall sample is not particularly helpful. This result changes only slightly if we focus on Intensive Buy cases. Here, we see some evidence of greater return per unit of risk for both the Sharpe and Treynor ratios.
However for value firms, the distinction in performance becomes clearer. Both the Sharpe and
Treynor ratios for value firms classified as Net Buy or Intensive Buy are roughly three to four times higher in scale compared to their respective non-net complements. The results seem to show clear evidence that the additional information gained from insider trading is indeed useful in, ex-ante, identifying additional excess performance.
Similarly, we report on the right side of Table 4 Information Ratios calculated with respect to four different benchmark portfolios: small, value, small-value, and the overall market portfolio. Given that we do not use a structured portfolio to match against a given benchmark, the absolute Information Ratio is not of particular importance to us. However what is helpful is to look at comparisons between sub-samples when insider trading information is added. As before when looking at the overall repurchase sample, we find only mild evidence that insider trading adds informational power on a return per unit of tracking error basis. Yet when we focus on value cases, Information Ratios dramatically increase across all benchmarks for the Net Buy and Intensive Buy groups, indicating that concurrent insider trading information is providing useful information at the margin to outside investors.
As a final illustration of the power of adding insider trading information to the information in repurchases, Figure 1 graphically presents cumulative monthly returns (in logarithmic scale) for the market portfolio and also for various repurchasing portfolios starting from January 1991 and through December 2010. The "Net Buy-Value" and especially "Intensive Buy-Value" portfolios are indeed superior; suggesting that publicly available insider trading information seems to be useful for value buyback firms. Consistent with the results we observed earlier, this same information is less helpful on the margin for non-value cases.
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C. Robustness
In Table 5 , we examine the abnormal performance of these same calendar-time portfolios using a more conventional academic empirical design. Here, we report evidence using the Fama-French threefactor model and the Carhart four-factor model to control for market, size, B/M, and momentum effects.
We report alphas from time-series regressions over the entire sample period and over three sub-periods to check the robustness of these results over time. Similar to our previous findings, for the overall sample when we condition on Net Buy, we do not see evidence of significant abnormal performance. For
Intensive Buy firms, the results strengthen slightly.
However, when we focus on value buyback firms where mispricing may be a greater motivating factor, both Net Buy and Intensive Buy firms significantly outperform even after controlling for risk. The monthly alpha for the three-factor model for the value Net Buy portfolio is 49 basis points, indicating an annualized abnormal return of nearly 6%. For value Intensive Buy firms, the points estimates are more than double in scale compared to those for value Net Buy firms. This performance is remarkably higher than the abnormal return observed for Non Buy firms (-11 bps per month) or for Non Intensive firms (-20 bps per month). We also report evidence assuming a zero-investment strategy that is long in Buy portfolios and short in Non Buy portfolios (i.e., the row labeled "Difference" in Table 5 ). Again, excess 20 One caveat to keep in mind in interpreting the results is that the "Intensive Buy-Value" group is composed of only 213 repurchases in total across our sample period (see Table 3 , Panel E), which represents less than 2.1% of our total sample.
performance for these zero investment portfolios is limited to value buyback cases.
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As a final check, we repeat the main analyses in Table 5 for two different groups based on the number of financial analysts, a proxy for the degree of informational asymmetry. Since one might expect insider trading information to be more useful when informational asymmetry is severe, we compare alphas of zero-investment portfolios formed from Buy versus Non-Buy cases under different levels of analyst coverage. In unreported results, we find that insider trading information is more useful among those firms with low analyst coverage. The results are consistent with the premise that the marginal signaling content of insider trading around buybacks is seemingly most useful for buyback cases motivated by mispricing (compared to other reasons) and also where the potential for mispricing due to factors such as neglect or informational asymmetry is greatest.
IV. Conclusions
Previous studies document superior return performance for firms which announce open market share repurchases. One reason active money managers often pay attention to buyback firms is that a rich literature suggests these announcements may be motivated by undervaluation. However, many question these findings. For example, mispricing is arguably only one reason among many for why managers repurchase stock and measuring long-horizon performance is difficult.
We try a new approach to shed light on this debate of the role of mispricing in motivating buybacks by considering concurrent insider trading behavior, an event where previous papers also conclude that managers have timing ability. At their core, the decision to invest for personal reasons due to mispricing (insider trading) and the decision for the company to repurchase stock due to the same reason share the same set of decision makers -the company's senior management. Given that the typical insider is "overexposed" in the company from a personal risk vantage point, insider purchases should conceivably be a positive and informative signal to outside investors in cases where repurchases were motivated by mispricing as opposed to other factors.
Consistent with this view, we find that considering insider trading behavior prior to the announcement of a buyback case is useful but is limited to cases where, ex-ante, the propensity for undervaluation reasonably exists. This includes buybacks announced by value companies and companies less widely followed by financial analysts. In other cases where mispricing may be a subsidiary reason compared to other motivating factors, adding insider trading information is not particularly useful. Given that long-horizon return performance can be measured in a variety of ways, we draw our conclusions based on several different approaches. We also consider performance metrics commonly used in practice.
Overall, our findings appear to be robust.
While this paper cannot completely assuage the skeptic, we provide confirming evidence that mispricing due to market undervaluation is indeed a key motive behind buyback decisions for an important subset of buyback firms. Concurrent insider trading does indeed appear to be useful in identifying mispricing driven buyback cases.
Future researchers may wish to consider whether the return drifts observed here and also reported by others for many years now are perhaps affected by direct or indirect trading costs thus giving the appearance of this anomaly surviving through time. While explicitly addressing this was beyond the scope of this paper, several of the empirical methods we rely on here use portfolios weighted toward more easily traded shares with comparatively lower trading costs. Another extension of this work would be to consider whether other groups of informed traders, such as institutional investors, similarly provide marginal information useful in identifying buyback cases driven by undervaluation.
Table 1 Summary Statistics by Insider Trading Group
This table reports summary information regarding sample repurchase firms. The sample includes all share repurchase announcements included in the Securities Data Corporation's share repurchase data from January 1990 to November 2010, with available CRSP daily returns and book equity information from the Compustat. P and S respectively represent insider purchases and sales transactions not related to the exercises of options within the past six months prior to a buyback announcement. Insider transactions are identified based on the filing dates and limited to those that are filed during the six-month period prior to the buyback announcement. Transactions with fewer than 100 shares or cases filed more than two months after the transaction date are excluded. Size of trade is the percentage of shares traded by insiders relative to total outstanding shares at month-end prior to the announcement. Dollar value of insider trading is expressed as thousands of dollars and adjusted to 2010 purchasing power using the US consumer price index. Size is the market value of equity at month-end prior to the announcement and is expressed in millions. B/M is the ratio of the book value of equity at the previous fiscal year-end to the market value of equity at month-end prior to the announcement. Size deciles and B/M quintiles are defined using the cutoffs based on NYSE firms only. The Prior One Year Return for repurchase firms is the buy-and-hold return from 252 days before (or the listing date) up to the day before the announcement. Each repurchase firm has five control firms, matched on the basis of size, B/M and exchange. The t-test's null hypothesis is that the mean prior one-year abnormal return is zero. p-values are from the Wilcoxon sign test for the equality of medians. 5-day Announcement Return is calculated by subtracting the matching firm return during the five-day window (-2, +2) around repurchase announcements. % of Shares Announced is the percentage of announced repurchase shares relative to total outstanding shares at month-end prior to the announcement. Net Buy represents firms with a greater number of insider purchases than sales during the sixmonth period prior to buyback announcements. Intensive Buy represents firms with at least three more insider purchases than sales during the six-month period prior to buyback announcements. Non Net (Non Intensive) represents repurchase firms that are not included in Net Buy (Intensive Buy) firms. To avoid the impact of skewness, all variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Numbers in the parentheses are median values. Purchases (Sales) is the mean number of insider purchase (sell) transactions during the six months preceding a repurchase announcement made on the open market or through a private transaction. No-opt Sales is the mean number of insider sells not related to an option exercise. Six-month represents a given six-month interval relative to the repurchase announcement date. REP represents share repurchasing firms and MAT represents the corresponding matching firms. Diff is the difference between repurchase firms and their corresponding matching firms. For each sample repurchase firm, there are five control firms matched on the basis of size, B/M and exchange. Growth subsample and Value subsample are composed of the bottom B/M quintile and the top B/M quintile, respectively. a, b, and c denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% for a t-test examining the equality of two averages. 
Table 3 Event-Time Average Monthly Returns (in %)
This table reports sample mean monthly returns in percent around repurchase announcements made between 1990 and 2006. For each repurchasing firm, average monthly returns are calculated over each event year from the year before to four years after a buyback announcement. n is the number of firms in each category. REP refers to the share repurchase sample and MAT refers to their respective matching firms. For each repurchase firm, there are five control firms matched on the basis of size, B/M and exchange. DIFF is the mean abnormal monthly return, the difference between monthly returns of repurchasing and corresponding matching firms. Growth subsample and Value subsample are composed of the bottom B/M quintile and the top quintile, respectively. In Panel A, all repurchase firms in our sample are included. In Panel B, Net Buy represents sample firms with a greater number of insider purchase trades than sales during the six-month period prior to a buyback announcement. In Panel C, Non Net represents sample firms that are not included in Net Buy firms. Panel D shows the difference between Net Buy versus Non Net. In Panel E, Intensive Buy represents sample firms with at least three more insider purchase trades than sales during the six-month period prior to a buyback announcement. In Panel F This table reports annualized metrics of portfolio performance for our sample and various sub-samples formed on the basis of insider trading criteria during the period January 1991 to December 2010. In each month, buyback portfolios are formed based on the buyback announcements made during the previous 12 months. Mean represents the annualized time-series average of calendar-time monthly portfolio returns. This is also reported for various sub portfolios and also for style-based reference portfolios for comparison. The Sharpe, Treynor and Information Ratios are reported in an annualized format. Sharpe ratio is the average excess return (i.e., portfolio return minus onemonth Treasury Bill return) divided by the standard deviation of that excess return. Treynor ratio is the average excess portfolio return divided by its estimated beta. Information ratio is the average difference in return between a sample portfolio and a given naively formed benchmark divided by the standard deviation of those return differences. REP represents the full sample of repurchase firms. Net Buy represents sample firms classified as having a greater number of purchases than sales during the six-month period prior to a buyback announcement. Non Net represents sample firms that are not included in Net Buy firms. Intensive Buy represents sample firms with at least three more purchases than sales during the six-month period prior to a buyback announcement. where R p is the repurchase firm portfolio return in a given month, R f is the risk-free rate, R m is the market portfolio return, SMB is the small-firm portfolio return minus big-firm portfolio return, and HML is the high book-to-market portfolio return minus the low book-to-market portfolio return, WML is the high prior-return portfolio return minus the low prior-return portfolio return. For each month from January 1991 to December 2010, we form a calendar-time portfolio by including sample firms that have announced repurchase programs in the past 12 months. Net Buy represents sample firms with a greater number of purchases than sales during the six-month period prior to a buyback announcement. Non Net represents sample firms that are not classified as Net Buy firms. Intensive Buy represents sample firms with at least three more purchases than sales during the six-month period prior to a buyback announcement. Non Intensive represents sample firms that are not included in Intensive Buy firms. Difference stands for a long/short portfolio, long in buying and short in non-buying portfolios. Each portfolio assumes a valueweighted investment strategy. Numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics. Firm returns are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Jan. 1991 -Dec. 2010 Jan. 1991 -Dec. 1997 Jan. Monthly returns of each portfolio are cumulated over the period from January 1991 and December 2010. Returns are reported as the natural logarithm of one plus the cumulative monthly return. When portfolio returns are missing in a given month due to a lack of eligible stocks, the S&P 500 index return is spliced into the series for that month. 
